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RAYER, ESQUIRE

First of all, as a resident of our fair city, I would like to welcome all
of you to New Orleans and assure you that if we can be of any assistance
to you personally in trying to give you any ideas as to where you should
go and what you should do, we would be most happy to do so. I might
just add for those of you who might be interested in a sort of busman's
holiday by foot, which would take you very little time, that the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is located within two blocks of the
hotel here in a very impressive old building, which architecturally I think
you would find interesting, and some of the arguments and comments of
the Fifth Circuit might also prove interesting. It is a rather forceful
bench.
The subject that we have been asked to discuss this morning involves
the imposition of the Federal Unemployment Tax, through the states, on
church-related elementary and secondary schools. I think for the benefit
of those of you who perhaps have not been directly involved in this situation, a brief historical overview of how this has come about might be
appropriate.
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act,' sometimes referred to as
FUTA, was amended by the Congress in 1976. Specifically, the Congress
amended what is codified in Title 26 as sections 3301 through 3309. These
sections were amended to remove exemptions that had heretofore existed
for educational institutions below the level of higher education. Thus in
1976, by reason of this amendment, Congress for the first time attempted
to extend the scope of coverage of Federal Unemployment Compensation
to employees of elementary and secondary schools.
There was, however, retained in section 3309(b) of the Act, the previously existing and still existing exemption of "persons in the employ of a
church, or convention or association of churches, or in the employ of an
26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976).

UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSATION

organization that is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches."
The effect of these congressional enactments was to attempt to
broaden the coverage of state unemployment programs through the vehicle of threatened withdrawal of federal certification of any state that
failed to adopt conforming amendments to their respective state unemployment laws. The practical effect of such decertification by the Secretary of Labor, would be to cut off certain federal funding to state programs, and, more significantly, to deny a tax credit against federal
unemployment payroll taxes paid by employers in the several states on
behalf of their employees. Therefore, under the federal statutory scheme,
the states, to some degree, were financially compelled, under the threat of
withdrawal of federal financial support, to enact conforming legislation by
January 1, 1978.
While most states, including Louisiana, have enacted such amendments in order to conform their state unemployment laws to the Federal
Act, some have failed or refused to do so, I think most notable of which is
New Hampshire, which is now engaged in a confrontation with Secretary
Marshall over decertification.
Subsequent to the amendments Secretary of Labor Marshall promulgated an interpretive opinion construing section 3309(b) as requiring
state unemployment coverage to extend to employees of all private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, including church-related or
church-sponsored elementary or secondary schools. As a result thereof,
many states, fearing decertification, have followed the mandate of Secretary Marshall's opinion and have required church-related elementary and
secondary schools of all denominations to file informational forms with
the State Department of Labor and to begin the payment of unemployment tax on either a basis of direct payment or on the basis of a reimbursable method which is optional to nonprofit corporations. The reimbursable method is a system whereby the entity does not have to pay in
advance an estimated or fixed percentage of the tax, but rather is obligated to reimburse the state for any sums which the state may have to
pay out to an employee who has been given the benefit of unemployment
compensation.
Consequently, this spectre of substantial, continuing, and additional
costs to the private church-related school has compelled a number of dioceses to consider a litigational challenge to the imposition of this tax on
church-related schools. Over the past year and a half, I think there has
surfaced substantial lack of unanimity on the question of whether the
Church should take a position in opposition to the payment of unemploy-

26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (1976).
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ment tax. Most of this opposition, as I appreciate it, has been directed
toward the social justice argument that churches and schools ought to be
giving these kinds of social benefits and not attempting to escape from
such a governmental mandate. I think that argument, however, overlooks
the basic problem that we envisage in the legislative scheme which does
not concern itself as much with the social aspect of whether employees
should be compensated after termination of their employment during a
period of unemployment, but basically the extent to which the government, through a state department of labor or other state agency, will be
allowed to interject itself into the determination of whether a terminated
employee is or is not entitled to unemployment benefits on the basis of
the justification of the termination of that employee, or perhaps also
whether the state, through this mechanism, can justifiably impose a
financial burden and penalty on a private church-related school which
desires to terminate one or more members of its faculty, and the resulting
chilling effect which that may have on the freedom of that school to determine, for a variety of religiously-oriented reasons that a particular
teacher or teachers should be terminated.
On those premises, the Louisiana Catholic Conference, comprising
the five dioceses in the state, determined that the Catholic Conference
would initiate litigation. This was not done, however, without a great deal
of soul searching, as well as conference and consultation with George
Reed's office and others who were involved in a similar problem.
I would like now to turn to a consideration of the litigational challenge and what we perceived immediately to be rather substantial procedural obstacles to the initiation of this challenge. Initially, I think the
"knee jerk" reaction of any constitutional trial attorney is to respond to
this type of challenge with a federal court suit seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against the Secretary of Labor on first amendment theories. Those of us who were tempted to plunge into this legal abyss were
blessed, however, with the benefit of recent case law that made it obvious
to us that there were formidable procedural obstacles to such a federal
challenge to Public Law 94-566. We had the benefit of the decision in
December, 1977 of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
in the case of County of Los Angeles v. Marshall.8 This suit was filed by
seven states and over a thousand counties and municipalities challenging
the amendment with which we were concerned, but it sought to broaden
the coverage of unemployment insurance to state, municipal and county
workers, heretofore exempt from the law, as were our elementary and secondary schools. Plaintiffs in that suit sought injunctive relief.
Ruling on preliminary motions to dismiss, District Court Judge
3 442
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Charles Richey found that the Federal Anti-Injunction Act barred injunctive relief against the implementation of the statute, specifically finding
under Title 26 of the U.S. Code section 7421, a prohibition against any
suit in the federal courts to restrain the collection of a tax. This alerted
us to the fact that we were engaged in litigation which primarily and fundamentally involved a challenge to the imposition of a tax at either the
federal or state level. This aspect of the case, therefore, immediately
made it evident that we were faced with these same procedural
difficulties.
Research into the matter disclosed that the only exceptions to the
rule are in circumstances where it could be established preliminarily that
the government would have no chance to prevail as a matter of law, or
where there would be no other adequate legal access to judicial review by
any other mechanism in any other forum. Judge Richey, in County of Los
Angeles, found that there was such redress and remedy through other
vehicles, and therefore dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on jurisdictional
grounds.
To further complicate the matter, we were also faced with a bar to
declaratory relief by reason of section 2201 of the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act.4 This section specifically prohibits declaratory relief in
any suit involving federal taxation except in certain isolated tax matters
such as a qualification review of 501(c)(3) corporations or the review of a
jeopardy assessment, none of which fit the mold of our case. The only
apparent exception that could be discerned by those of us who were looking into this matter of the federal forum was the premise that there is no
other adequate access to judicial review. This argument perhaps could be
made to sustain federal standing to sue under the concept which was basically announced in a district court case involving the National Restaurant Association which attempted to and successfully obtained injunctive
relief against the Internal Revenue with respect to the declaration of income by employee waiters who were not declaring income by way of tips.
We in Louisiana, however, decided not to go to federal court because of
the obstacles involved and opted instead to go to state court. There were,
however, additional procedural obstacles to overcome. I mention this for
the benefit of those of you who may be considering litigation in this area
in your own state forums.
The Louisiana State constitution contains an article which specifically prohibits any injunctive relief against the collection of any state tax.
There is corresponding language contained in our Revised Statutes. The
statutes, however, provide a remedy for redress against the imposition of
any tax, if the tax is paid under protest to the State Department of Reve28 U.S.C. §2201 (1976).
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nue. Subsequently a suit may be filed to recover, by way of refund, the
tax paid and also to have a declaratory judgment as to whether the tax
has been rightfully imposed.
A further dilemma confronting us in the early part of 1978, however,
was that all of the dioceses in Louisiana already were brought under the
aegis of the state unemployment law by reason of Secretary Marshall's
opinion and were required to file informational forms with the State Department of Labor, under protest, indicating the number of schools, the
number of employees, etc., and further were required to opt for either the
direct tax payment or the reimbursable method of taxation. All of the
schools had, therefore, opted for the reimbursable method, which meant
that we were not going to be in a position to pay any tax until such time
as, during an appropriate quarter of 1978, some teacher had been dismissed and had, in fact, collected unemployment benefits, which only
then would be reimbursable to the State Department of Labor. The chronology and timing therefore was such that it was not until the third quarter of 1978 that such an event actually occurred. We therefore finally had
a viable taxpayer in the form of one or more elementary or secondary
schools which had been assessed a tax which could be paid under protest
to trigger the filing of a state court suit. So it was not until the fall of last
year that we were finally able to get into a state court, and that suit now
has been filed in the state district court against the State Department of
Labor and a trial is pending.
In the meantime, out of an abundance of precaution, we had filed a
protest with the State Department of Labor, and had requested an administrative review and hearing on the matter. We went through the pro
forma hearing and got the State Secretary of Labor to issue an opinion
following Secretary Marshall's opinion to the effect that we were indeed
covered by the state unemployment law by reason of the amendments
previously adopted by the legislature. So we made sure, before we initiated the suit, that we had exhausted all of our administrative remedies as
set forth in our state Administrative Procedure Act. And I would commend to you who are contemplating suit to review your state's Administrative Procedure Act, if such exists, to ascertain whether you must go
through that process prior to the filing of suit.
Let us now consider briefly the litigational challenge, the constitutional arguments and the substantive issues which perhaps can or should
be made. As we envisage the approach to the first amendment religion
clauses challenge, it may be a dual, or perhaps a threefold, approach. Initially, from the statutory language of section 3309(b), there is still in the
statutes, both state and federal, a specific exemption for organizations
that are "operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a
church," and Catholic elementary and secondary schools, therefore, would
fit this mold. It was on the basis of that concept that a Chancery Court in
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Mobile, Alabama, has recently held that the imposition of unemployment
compensation laws in the state of Alabama is not valid because of the
exemption which is specifically granted in the state and federal law. The
court's finding was that there is, in fact, a substantial identity between
the school and the church entity which operates and controls it.
While there is ample precedent to support this proposition in such
cases as Waltz, Lemon, Nyquist, Meek and Wolman, and I think the argument should certainly be made as a part of the challenge, nevertheless,
we feel this approach involves perhaps some inherent dangers that would
persuade us to place less emphasis on it as forming the primary constitutional basis for a decision than other arguments in support thereof. The
first danger is that the argument must be articulated with care and precision so as to avoid, as much as possible, placing the court in a position of
being given either opportunity, or perhaps being compelled, to define
what the term "church" involves. I think we should not attempt to try
and persuade the court that the ultimate definition of the term "church"
must necessarily include elementary and secondary schools.
Secondly, when confronted with the problem of fitting nondiocesan
private secondary schools such as those operated by religious orders of
women and men into this mold, we perhaps fall short of the mark when
we talk about "primarily supervised, operated and controlled by the
church." I would think that we ought to stay clear of that argument as
much as possible with that category of school, having in mind principally
the federal decision of several years ago in the Christian Brothers Winery
case 5 where the court looked at the nature of the Brothers of the Christian Schools and said that for purposes of federal taxation on the winery,
you are not a church. So, if you happen to be in a location where you have
a Christian Brothers high school that forms a part of your litigational
challenge, you are going to have to handle that issue with some delicacy.
Perhaps the less difficult approach appears to be an establishment or
religion clause argument premised on the excessive entanglement theory
in the light of the very recent NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago' decision. In any argument based on the lack of legislative intent to include
church-related schools in the statutory scheme, the entanglement argument should be made so as to avoid the issue of the religious nature of
the school itself. Rather, it should concentrate on what really becomes
more of a free exercise argument, which I suppose, would be bottomed on
Wisconsin v. Yoder 7 and its progeny, as applied to the teacher in the
Catholic school setting. By that I mean that, as the Amish were granted
their free exercise right to reject materialistic, formal education in its en'

De La Salle Inst. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961).

6 440 U.S. 490 (1979).

406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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tirety, so also do church-related schools have an analagous right to structure Catholic education along broad Judeo-Christian lines, which particularly and most importantly requires not so much curricular content, but
rather personal commitment on the part of teachers and faculty to those
moral and social values consistent with the Catholic philosophy of education. The particular nexus between the first amendment principles in this
regard and the challenged unemployment law lies principally in the administrative scheme of the determination of entitlement of the terminated employee to benefits.
For the most part, under state laws, the employee is entitled to unemployment benefits only in those instances where his or her termination
has been without justifiable cause. There is a substantial body of jurisprudence and case law, at least in Louisiana, involving judicial review of a
Department of Labor's decisions as to whether or not an employee has
been terminated for cause, and ergo is entitled to unemployment benefits.
Therefore, the state must, if the law applies to elementary and secondary
Catholic schools, inevitably involve or substantially entangle itself with
school policy in reaching that particular issue as to entitlement. In situations where the termination was premised on religious, moral or personal
lifestyle grounds, it would require the reviewing authority to substitute its
judgment for that of the school administration in such very delicate matters as to specifically whether the termination of employment was based
upon religious or moral grounds, or whether the termination of employment was consistent with the moral principles or the religious principles
of the particular faith, or perhaps was an unreasonable or unjustifiable
interpretation or application of those principles by the school's governing
authority. I think we can find ample language in almost any of these recent church-state cases to give rise to great concern over the kind of involvement of the state in determinations by a church-related school of its
operation and policies.
Furthermore, I think we can make an argument that the mere prospect of the extension of unemployment benefits to terminated teachers
has the obvious result of creating a serious chilling effect on the free exercise rights of the school to terminate its faculty when faced with the spectre of substantial financial impact as a result of such termination. Finally,
and perhaps most effectively, the argument should be made that there is
nothing in the legislation or the legislative history of the 1976 amendments by the Congress, or in state legislation, to indicate that either the
Congress or the states ever intended that these changes in the unemployment law result in coverage of church-related school employees. The
amendment, as originally adopted, simply deleted the negative exclusion
of the prior law which said that unemployment would not extend to employees of other than higher educational institutions. There is no language whatsoever to indicate the scope or breadth of the intent of the
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Congress. Our research indicates that the legislative history of the 1976
amendments, in terms of the debates before the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee, contain no enlightenment as
to the intent of Congress in this regard. This approach was initially made,
I think, or suggested by U.S.C.C. as one of the many arguments that can
be made in support of the exclusion of our schools prior to the NLRB
case.
However, with the advent of the NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago decision, this approach perhaps takes on some special significance.
The Court in the NLRB decision, and I have to confess that I have not
thoroughly analyzed it but only given it somewhat of a cursory reading,
appears to adopt an approach that is very analogous to reading an Alfred
Hitchcock mystery novel. You think you're going to find out who the villain is, and everything tends to make you believe that you know exactly
who it is, until you get to the last chapter, and it turned out to be the
maid instead of the butler. The Court leads you down a path of nine or
ten pages of agreeing with the circuit court of appeals as to their analysis
of all of the problems attendant to the entanglement of the National Labor Relations Board in the affairs of the Church in collective bargaining.
Then it adroitly evades a collision with the claims that were made on the
basis of the religion clauses. The Court concluded that it need not reach
these delicate issues since it found "no clear expression of an affirmative
intention of Congress that teachers in church-operated schools should be
covered by the Act." 8 The Court simply concluded that, and again I quote
from the Burger majority opinion: "Our examination of the statute and
its legislative history indicates that Congress simply gave no consideration to church-operated schools."'
Therefore, after nine and one-half pages of dicta leading to what one
would surely anticipate to be a significant first amendment pronouncement, the Burger majority opinion suddenly fell short of that mark and
concluded with this brief statement: "Accordingly, in the absence of a
clear expression of Congress' intent to bring teachers in church-operated
schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe the
Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult
and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses." 10 Affirmed.
This language may be of considerable comfort to us in the unemployment cases since neither the legislative history of the 1970 FUTA amendments nor that of the 1976 amendments gives any explanation or indication that Congress had in mind the coverage or the absence of coverage of
* 440
Id.

U.S. at 504.

'0Id. at 507.
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church-related schools within the federal unemployment scheme. Since
the legislative history gives no enlightenment, I think we ought to make
that argument. We have, looking at the NLRB case, some reservations
that we ought to make as to whether we can simply plunge in to a facial
attack on a state or federal unemployment act premised entirely on the
language of the NLRB decision. I say that because, at first blush, it would
appear to me that what the Court has done initially, as a fundamental
basis to its conclusion that we ought to keep hands off here, is to make a
sort of backwards finding that there would be the potential of significant
excessive entanglement of government with the affairs of church if the
Act were to be implemented. The first nine pages of the opinion substantially express the concern of the Court, and clearly, in many instances,
indicate that the Court believes that this statutory scheme has the potential of creating real first amendment problems which they are not inclined
to rule on. By that I mean I do not know, at this time, whether we simply
could go in such a suit as the unemployment case and, relying upon the
language of the Burger opinion, seek summary judgment on the basis of
affidavits or exhibits, claiming that it fit the mold of the NLRB case,
without first demonstrating factually that the imposition of unemployment laws on church-related schools would have at least the potential of
excessively entangling the state and the federal government with the affairs of church. I say that because I cannot really believe that the Court is
going to be willing to extend this logic of the NLRB case to all federal
legislation, and, I would presume, to state legislation as well because of
what the Court has said in the Cantrell" case, applying the first amendment to the states. That is, in all instances of federal and state legislation
where there is no clear and evident indication that either Congress or a
state legislature intended church-related schools to be covered, they are
going to be excluded. It would seem to me that the Court is going to have
to stop short of that kind of a conclusion, because if we go to that extreme, we are talking about perhaps questioning the right of the state to
control elementary and secondary nonpublic education in such fundamental areas as health and safety, minimum standards of education, and
compulsory attendance laws. I know there are some substantial body of
legal scholars who would contend perhaps that the government does not
have the right to get into that area, but recent opinions suggest the
contrary.
I think the Court would likewise have difficulty in extending this
logic to Title VI, section 1981 civil rights claims involving federal funding
of church-related schools. The Court would undoubtedly have difficulty
reconciling that concept with what they have said already in this area
" Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
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under section 1981 civil rights claims in Runyon v. McCrary.2 It would
appear that the Runyon case, although it involved private nonsectarian
schools, would have to be squared with that concept. It would seem to me
that what the Court is perhaps saying in NLRB is that you need a fact
case giving rise to first amendment entanglement concerns before it
would be willing to adopt this approach.
Now, finally, as an update on what has occurred, I think I should give
you a little bit of background on the state of litigation pending elsewhere
than Louisiana. As I say, this case is pending in the district court and
hopefully we will have a hearing on the matter before the end of the summer, after we decide how we will present our case. In January of this year,
the Alabama Circuit Court of Mobile County did render a very favorable
and well-reasoned opinion in the case of Trinity Lutheran Church v. Alabama Department of Labor. I would commend that opinion to you for
reading and analysis if you are involved in this kind of litigation.
There was a federal court suit filed by the Baptists in Memphis, Tennessee. That case, however, was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because of the Anti-Injunction Act and Anti-Declaratory Judgment Act or
perhaps on grounds of prematurity.
There was another state court suit filed in Tennessee, in Chattanooga, and this resulted in a favorable decision in favor of another denominational group. I understand that the Diocese of Nashville has likewise filed
a suit in Tennessee. So Tennessee apparently is very active in this area.
There are also suits, as I understand, by the Lutherans in Iowa, the
Baptists in Georgia, and there is a very favorable opinion by the Attorney
General in Michigan, and a favorable administrative appeal decision by
the Department of Labor in Oregon, all of which tends to support the
theory that we can prevail in this case, although it is going to be rather
touchy as to how the constitutional argument is presented. I feel that all
of us who have studied this matter are very much concerned that the
issue of the identity of the church-related school with the church itself be
handled with some delicacy because a judicial definition in this area may
have farreaching impact in other areas of church-state relations, particularly in the area of how, when, and where church-related schools can be
the beneficiaries of financial aid.

"

427 U.S. 160 (1976).

